Egypt Security Sector Report
This week’s dispatch explores Sisi’s deepening legitimacy crisis, the Arab League summit’s plans for Gaza’s reconstruction, and economic and political shifts in the region. I cover the regime’s moves to militarize society, human rights abuses in prisons, and foreign relations with the EU and Gulf states. I also delve into the Ethiopian-Somali rapprochement, Egypt’s tightening of travel restrictions following reports that Egyptians were recruited into the Russian army, and the fallout from Ras el-Hikma’s forced evictions.
📁 Sisi Has a Hegemony Problem
As its crisis of legitimacy deepens, a faux “civil society” is to reinforce the regime’s hold on power.
📁 Palestine
An emergency Arab League summit convened in Cairo on Tuesday, to address the Gaza crisis and counter Trump’s resettlement proposal. The plan—estimated at $53 billion over five years—aims to restore Gaza’s infrastructure without displacing its 2 million residents. It envisions clearing more than 50 million tons of rubble and unexploded ordnance as an initial phase, then “completely reshaping” Gaza with sustainable, green urban developments and rebuilt housing in subsequent phases. Temporary housing inside Gaza would shelter up to 1.5 million displaced locals during reconstruction.
Under the plan, Hamas would cede administrative control of Gaza. An interim body of independent Palestinian technocrats would govern until a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) can take charge.
The Arab leaders appealed for greater international involvement to stabilize the situation. The communique urged the UN Security Council to deploy an international peacekeeping force in both Gaza and the West Bank to help protect Palestinians. It also announced that Egypt, in cooperation with the UN, will host an international donor conference for Gaza’s reconstruction. A World Bank–managed trust fund is to be established to receive and disburse reconstruction pledges transparently. The summit vowed to mobilize “all types of financial, material and political support” for rebuilding Gaza, and pressed the global community to contribute “quickly.”
While most Arab League states sent delegations to Cairo, several prominent leaders did not attend in person, hinting at political undercurrents:
Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was a no-show, even though his attendance had been expected “until early this morning,” according to an Egyptian official. Instead, Saudi Arabia was represented by its FM. MBS’s last-minute absence surprised Cairo and was widely interpreted as a sign of reservations. In the run-up to the summit, Riyadh had refused to pledge any funds for Gaza’s reconstruction without broader international agreement on the plan’s terms. Saudi officials wanted to see a clear financing mechanism and global buy-in before committing money. They may also have been reluctant to clash with Washington openly; with Trump pressing a different Gaza agenda, MBS chose to quietly support the Arab consensus (Saudi signed onto the final communique) but not appear on stage championing it. In short, the kingdom’s de facto ruler kept a low profile, reflecting Saudi Arabia’s cautious balancing of Arab solidarity with its own strategic calculus.
The UAE: Similarly, President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) did not attend, sending a lower-level official to Cairo. The UAE had been skeptical of Egypt’s approach toward Hamas. In fact, Abu Dhabi “categorically refused” to participate in Gaza reconstruction unless Hamas and all Palestinian armed factions were dissolved and a new local authority created. Those hardline conditions were not met at the summit—the Arab plan does sideline Hamas politically, but it doesn’t force Hamas’s disarmament immediately. MBZ’s absence signaled the UAE’s displeasure with any outcome that leaves Hamas intact. Nonetheless, the Emiratis did not obstruct the summit’s resolutions; their representatives joined the consensus. The UAE’s stance is that it might contribute funds only after a more stringent political outcome (removal of Hamas) is assured. Until then, its top leader chose to stay away, underlining a policy gap with Egypt on how to handle Gaza.
Algeria: President Abdelmadjid Tebboune boycotted the summit, sending his FM instead. In the days before, Algerian state media announced the country “rejects the absolute dominance of some Arab capitals over the fate of the Palestinian issue.” This was a thinly veiled critique aimed at powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Algiers has long taken a nominally pro-Palestine hard line and often bristles at Gulf or Western influence. Tebboune’s no-show thus telegraphed dissatisfaction with how the summit’s agenda was being set—perhaps viewing it as too dominated by Egypt’s and Saudi’s vision. Algeria had hosted its own Arab summit in 2022 emphasizing Palestinian rights, and it likely wanted to assert independence now. By staying home, Tebboune underscored Algeria’s position that no single bloc should monopolize the Palestinian file. Despite this, Algeria did endorse the final resolutions (through its delegates) reaffirming Palestinian rights, aligning with the substance if not the process.
Tunisia: President Kais Saied also did not attend in person, delegating the task to FM Mohamed Ali Nafti. The Tunisian presidency announced that it would “reaffirm its firm and unwavering support for Palestinian rights, foremost among them the establishment of an independent, sovereign state across all of Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital.” In other words, Tunisia signaled that Saied’s absence did not imply any disagreement with the summit’s goals. Saied’s reasons for not traveling were not explicitly stated; they may relate to Tunisia’s domestic troubles or simply protocol (Tunisia has occasionally sent lower-level officials to summits in the past). In this case, Tunisia aligned with Algeria in avoiding a high-profile presence, yet made a point of supporting the summit’s final statement. The country’s emphasis on “all of Palestine” as the Palestinian state (implying a maximalist stance) is slightly stronger rhetoric than the two-state consensus, reflecting public opinion in Tunisia. Saied likely calculated that Tunisia’s voice was on record and his personal attendance was not necessary.
Others: Most other Arab heads of state did participate or were represented by their top officials. Notably, Qatar’s Emir, Jordan’s King, and Egypt’s Sisi were present, as were the leaders of PA, Syria, and Iraq, among others. Morocco’s King was absent due to scheduling health issues (he rarely attends Arab League summits personally, sending his prime minister instead). In summary, the absences of MBS, MBZ, Tebboune, and Saied were the most significant. Each reflected a different motive—from diplomatic hedging to principled objection—but collectively they hinted at rifts in Arab unity.
Sisi positioned Egypt as the author and driving force of the Gaza reconstruction plan, seeking to fill the diplomatic vacuum and counter outside proposals like Trump’s. However, the summit’s dynamics also highlighted how Egypt’s regional influence has waned in recent years, eclipsed by the rise of Gulf powers and constrained by Egypt’s own internal challenges.
The Cairo summit illustrated this shift: Egypt had to coordinate closely with Riyadh to ensure the summit’s success, and many viewed Saudi buy-in as essential for any Arab plan to gain traction. Indeed, key decisions were hashed out in Riyadh beforehand—Egypt’s Sisi flew to meet MBS on February 20 to fine-tune the Gaza plan in consultation with Saudi, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE. This behind-the-scenes choreography showed that Cairo could no longer simply dictate outcomes; it needed consensus with Gulf heavyweights.
Egypt’s reduced influence was evident in its inability to secure full cooperation from allies. For example, Sisi’s government failed to obtain advance financing commitments from Gulf states for the Gaza plan. In weeks of pre-summit talks, Saudi Arabia balked at pledging funds up front, insisting on broad international backing first. The UAE set tough conditions, refusing to contribute unless Hamas was removed from the equation. These hesitations forced Egypt to water down or postpone key details of its initiative; the summit’s final declaration adopted the plan in principle but kicked detailed funding decisions to a later donor conference (“as soon as possible”). In Nasser’s heyday, Egypt might have strong-armed Arab states into compliance; in 2025, Sisi had to accommodate their demands. Gulf countries effectively hold Egypt’s economic lifeline (via aid and investments), which undercuts Cairo’s bargaining power.
Aware of its eroding sway, Egypt has turned to international partners to bolster its regional role. The presence of the UN Secretary-General and EU and African Union leaders at the Arab summit was no coincidence. Sisi’s government invited these figures to Cairo to give the event global heft and to showcase Egypt as a necessary convenor between Arabs and the world. Egypt is leveraging its diplomatic connections to compensate for regional shortcomings – acting as the venue where global and Arab interests intersect. This strategy helps Cairo stay relevant: by orchestrating a plan that the clinically dead Arab League, UN, and EU can all rally around, Egypt positions itself as an indispensable mediator. However, it also underscores that Egypt alone could not marshal the needed resources—it must mobilize international and regional support” for its initiatives.
Sisi’s Egypt is grappling with a severe economic crisis and public discontent. These troubles limit Egypt’s ability to project power abroad—financially and politically. Sisi’s regime regularly overstates its diplomatic victories in Palestine as a way to boost its image at home, given the lack of economic success. However, the lukewarm turnout of top Arab leaders was a reality check—it highlighted that many in the region see Egypt as a junior partner to the Gulf on big initiatives.
Israel and the US both rejected the Arab reconstruction plan. However, on Thursday, the US sent mixed signals. For their part, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain said on Saturday they supported the plan.
In other news related to Egypt/Palestine:
Amid the Gaza genocide, Israel’s natural gas exports to Egypt and Jordan surged by about 13.4% in 2024.
Hamas held a reception on Friday in Cairo for the latest batch of released Palestinian prisoners who await their deportation to other countries.
An Israeli drone targeted an Egyptian bulldozer clearing the rubble in Beit Hanoun on Saturday, injuring the driver. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry did not comment.
📁 Suez Canal
Egyptian PM Mostafa Madbouly stated on Wednesday that Suez Canal revenues are expected to recover gradually from April if regional stability improves.
Ansar Allah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, however, warned on Friday that if Israel continues to block aid to Gaza, his group will resume attacks against Israeli interests. The statement, which also criticized US support for Israel, comes three days after Trump redesignated the Houthis as a terrorist organization—raising fears of renewed maritime traffic disruptions.
📁 Cairo Tightens Travel Requirements to Russia Amid Reports of Egyptians in Russian Army
Egyptian authorities have tightened travel restrictions to Russia following the Ukrainian military’s announcement of capturing several Egyptian recruits fighting for the Russian army.
Starting February 2025, Egypt’s police require travelers to Russia and Ukraine to provide evidence of employment or enrollment at educational institutions, effectively barring most tourism. Under the updated procedures, travelers must obtain an additional security clearance from the MOI’s Immigration and Passports Authority in Abbasiya, where officials review documents and conduct a security interview to determine if travel is permitted.
📁 Egyptian Authorities Heroically Retrieve Abducted Citizens After Sisi’s “Swift” Directives (19 Months Later)
In a dazzling display of efficiency, the Cairo proudly announced the return of Egyptians abducted by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Following urgent and immediate directives from Sisi to “take all necessary measures,” Egyptian officials sprang into action, and—just a mere 19 months later—the hostages have finally been retrieved. A true testament to the regime’s unwavering commitment to speed and effectiveness.
The dramatic rescue operation involved a carefully choreographed sequence of sternly worded letters, diplomatic coffee meetings, and a solid game of wait-and-see, all leading to the safe transfer of the abducted Egyptians from the conflict areas in central Khartoum to Port Sudan. The hostages were then returned home.
One must compare this grand success to the earlier legendary episode when Egyptian soldiers stationed in Sudan for joint military training found themselves detained by the RSF at Merowe Airbase in April 2023. That crisis, too, was masterfully handled through a strategic blend of patience, photo ops, and excessive praise for Sisi’s “visionary leadership”—which, as always, involved him doing absolutely nothing while waiting for others to resolve the matter.
Nonetheless, with yet another manufactured crisis now resolved, Egyptians can rest easy knowing that their government remains as committed as ever to its core mission: issuing statements, holding ceremonies, and congratulating itself for fixing problems it had no role in solving.