Inside the Surveillance Apparatus
Egypt Security Sector Report
This issue opens with a guest post by Mostafa, investigating the Ministry of Interior (MOI)’s expanding surveillance infrastructure. It also covers UN calls to lift restrictions on freed rights defenders, new US terrorism designations, Maersk’s return to the Suez Canal, refugee abuses, and the military’s widening role in welfare and religious control. Moreover, the issue includes a critical profile of Hisham Badawy, tracing his path from the Supreme State Security Prosecution to the parliament speaker.
Big Brother Is Watching
Last year, the MOI released a promotional film titled “Hidden World.” Framed as an exposé on the dangers of internet-related crimes, the film primarily serves as a public relations production designed to showcase the MOI’s technological reach and justify the expansion of its surveillance capabilities.
At its core, the film functions as an announcement of the establishment of the Security Operations Center (SOC), a project that satellite imagery suggests was completed in late 2024.
The SOC is presented as a centralized command-and-control hub, powered by a software platform that integrates multiple security services into a single system. According to the film, the center relies heavily on artificial intelligence to process and analyze data collected from thousands of CCTV cameras deployed across Egypt. The narrative portrays this mass surveillance infrastructure as a necessary response to digital crime, while offering no discussion of accountability, oversight, or citizens’ rights.
A closer examination of the footage reveals the internal organization of the operations room. Personnel appear to be divided into clusters, each consisting of six officers. At the center sits a single commanding officer, supported by three supervisors positioned directly in front of him. The room is symmetrical, with six clusters to the left and six to the right of the central command. In total, this setup suggests that 72 officers, along with three supervisors and one leader—76 officers altogether—operate simultaneously during a single shift. The emphasis on scale and coordination reinforces the film’s intended message of omnipresence and control.
One of the film’s key claims is that facial recognition technology was used to solve a criminal case linked to dark web activity. This moment is particularly significant, as it represents the first official acknowledgment by the Ministry of Interior that facial recognition is being incorporated into its operational workflow. Several scenes in the film display interfaces resembling facial recognition investigations, though no technical details or legal justifications are provided. The presentation treats this capability as an unquestionable success, without addressing its implications for privacy or misuse.
The software infrastructure underpinning the SOC remains officially undisclosed. However, the context provided by earlier state projects offers clues. In 2022, Sisi inaugurated the Control Operations Center of the National Network for Emergency and Public Safety (NAS), a system intended to unify communications and data across government entities. Officially, NAS aims to improve emergency response times and inter-agency coordination. In practice, it also established a centralized data backbone built on Huawei infrastructure, using the Holosens iClient platform. Huawei was reportedly the only corporate representative present at the inauguration.
This background strongly suggests that the SOC is likely built on similar Huawei infrastructure. Despite this, no transparent information has been made public regarding contractual terms, data governance, or the security measures supposedly in place to protect citizens’ personal information. The lack of disclosure raises serious concerns, particularly given the scale of surveillance involved.
The MOI’s promotion of facial recognition technology aligns with a long-standing ambition among Egyptian security institutions. In 2019, then–Minister of Defense Mohamed Zaki inspected development projects at the Armed Forces Information Systems Institute. Footage from the visit showed a facial recognition system reportedly developed by Yitu Technology, a Chinese firm closely associated with large-scale biometric surveillance. No official confirmation has since been provided regarding whether this system was formally adopted, leaving its status ambiguous.
While there is currently no conclusive public evidence that facial recognition systems in Egypt have been used directly for political repression, the legal environment surrounding data protection tells a more troubling story. The Personal Data Protection Law explicitly exempts certain administrative and security bodies from full compliance. These exemptions grant vaguely defined powers to collect and process personal data, with little to no judicial oversight. In the absence of clear legislative safeguards, the expansion of surveillance technologies such as facial recognition becomes deeply concerning—particularly when controlled by national security agencies operating beyond meaningful accountability.
Counterrevolution in Egypt
Phil Butland, of The Left Berlin, sat down with me to chat about my new book.
Badawy: From Supreme State Security Prosecutor to Parliament Enforcer
Continue reading this post for free, courtesy of Hossam el-Hamalawy.
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